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ginia has been to "protect and reclaim" by allowing a great deal
of discretion with the juvenile court judge.' It would appear that
West Virginia procedure is anomalous to the holdings in Gault.
The guidelines for future juvenile proceedings in West Virginia
must be revised to conform with the rulings in Gault. This can be
accomplished either by the Legislature, as part of a comprehensive
statutory overhaul, or by the Supreme Court of Appeals on a case
by case basis. Regardless of the method of revision, it is clear that
accused juveniles in juvenile court proceedings now have the
right to counsel, the right of cross-examination, protection against
self-incrimination, and timely notice of "charges" against them.
Gault requires "due process of law" in juvenile court proceedings.
John Hampton Tinney

Constitutional Law-Who May Constitutionally Issue A Warrant?
P, arrested on a warrant issued by a lieutenant of police, was
charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. The city
charter authorized captains and lieutenants of police, in the absence of the chief of police, to issue warrants for offenses in
violation of ordinances of the city. P claims that the ordinance
constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority in
contravention of the separation of powers provision of the state
constitution.' The lower court upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance and the validity of the warrants. Held, affirmed. The
court held in a 3-2 decision that, at the lower levels of government,
there must necessarily be an overlapping of functions in responsible
officials and that issuance of a warrant is the type of an act which
does not require or involve the exercise of supreme judicial power
within the meaning of that term as used in the constitution. State
ex rel. Sahley v. Thompson, 151 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1966).
The factual situation of this case presents succinctly a basic constitutional issue which the courts of this country have had to resolve
in the past and most certainly will be confronted with in the future.
21

50 Ops. W. VA. AT'ey GEN.

257 (1963).

' "The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and
distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either
of the others; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of
them at the same time. . .. ' W. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
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The West Virginia court was called upon to decide between a
strict interpretation of the West Virginia constitutional provision2
calling for separation of powers, and a more liberal interpretation
which might in essence involve a slight but expedient encroachment.
The impact of this decision on West Virginia's legal system and
society in general merits comment.
The ultimate issue before the court was whether the issuance
of a warrant by a lieutenant of police, who both parties concede
is not a judicial officer, violates the constitutional provision calling
for separation of powers. Before a decision can be reached, that
issue must be broken down into two more specific issues. The first
is whether the issuance of a warrant is a judicial act so as to preclude issuance by a non-judicial officer, and, second, whether
West Virginia will sanction a liberal interpretation of the separation
of powers provision and thus allow a slight overlapping of functions at the lower levels of government.
Considering the first issue, the majority opinion in the principal
case conceded that the issuance of a warrant is in essence a judicial
act. The court then proceeded to discuss whether the finding of
probable cause incident to the issuance of an arrest warrant was a
judicial function or only a quasi-judicial function. The West
Virginia Supreme Court cited the United States Supreme Court in
Ocampo v. United States3 which stated: "[I]n short, the function
of determining that probable cause exists for the arrest of a person
accused is only quasi-judicial, and not such that, because of its
nature, it must necessarily be confined to a strictly judicial officer
or tribunal."4
Many seemingly unsatisfactory attempts have been made to define the term "quasi-judicial." The West Virginia court quoted
Black's Law Dictionary which has defined it as action or discretion
by an administrative officer whereby this officer is required to
investigate or ascertain the existence of facts and draw conclusions
2

Id.

3234 U.S.
4 Id. The

91, 100 (1914).
Supreme Court also stated: It is insisted that the finding of
probable cause is a judicial act, and cannot properly be delegated to a
prosecuting attorney. We think, however, that it is erroneous to regard this
function, as performed by committing
judicial in the proper sense. There is
that there is no probable cause is not
entitles the accused to his liberty for
rearrest.

magistrates generally . . . as being

no definite adjudication. A finding
equivalent to an acquittal, but only
the present, leaving him subject to
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therefrom as a basis for official action, and for the exercise of
judicial discretion.' Similarly, another court held that when a law
commits to an officer the duty of looking into facts and acting on
them through discretion in its nature judicial, the function is
"quasi-judicial," and does not violate the constitutional provision
calling for separation of powers.' As to what acts are considered
quasi-judicial, the Illinois court has stated that "where a power
vests in a judgment or discretion so that it is of a judicial character
or nature, but does not involve the exercise of the functions of a
judge, or is conferred upon an officer having no authority of a
judicial character, the expression used is generally 'quasi-judicial'."'
To further the contention that the issuance of a warrant is in essence
only a quasi-judicial act so that non-judicial officers may be
authorized to issue them, the Alabama court upheld the validity of
a warrant issued by a county solicitor.8 The Alabama court although
not using the term "quasi-judicial" held that the issuance of a warrant was a judicial function as distinguished from merely administrative or ministerial powers but that the legislature may commit such functions to ministerial officers because it is not a final
judicial determination.9 Rather than define the term, it appears
the courts have merely been able to point out that where administrative officers perform judicial type acts, they will term them
"quasi-judicial," i.e., the term has been defined by describing what
functions shall be included within it. Then, by bootstrap reasoning,
the courts proceed to say it is proper for administrative officials to
perform these quasi-judicial acts.
It seems apparent that there are differences of opinion on whether
issuance of a warrant is a judicial or a quasi-judicial act. However,
the majority in the principal case relied heavily on the decision in
State v. Furmage'" which held that whether the issuance of a
warrant was regarded as a judicial, quasi-judicial or a ministerial
act, it does not require or involve the exercise of supreme judicial
power within the meaning of that term as used in the state constitutional provision calling for separation of powers."
5 United States Steel Corp. v. Stokes, 138 W. Va. 506, 512, 76 S.E.2d
474, 477 (1953).
6 Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation Dist. v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410,
429, 41 N.W.2d 397, 410 (1950).
7 Parker v. Kirkland, 298 Ill.
App. 340, 349, 18 N.E.2d 709, 714 (1939).
8 Holloman v. State, 37 Ala. App. 599, 74 So. 2d 612 (1954).
9Id.at 601, 74 So. 2d at 614.
10 250 N.C. 616, 109 S.E.2d 563 (1959).
1 Id. at 627, 109 S.E.2d at 571.
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The opposing view, as set forth by the dissenting judges, contends that issuance of a warrant is clearly a judicial act and thus
can only be performed by an authorized judicial officer. 2 In
accord with this view, the New York court, in ruling that a warrant
of arrest is a judicial order and must be signed by an authorized
judicial officer, stated that "criminal process leading to a trial must
be issued by a court or magistrate on sworn information, not by an
executive, such as a policeman, on his own motion." 3
To further complicate this issue, the states have differed considerably in ruling on who may be authorized to issue warrants. While
the power to issue warrants is most frequently exercised by justices
of the peace and police magistrates, it can be conferred on other
officials. 4 Generally, local laws prescribe who shall issue warrants.
Many federal and state officers, departments and bodies may issue
them.' 5 In Bowen v. State'6 the Oklahoma court ruled that a clerk
of a county court has no authority to issue a warrant."7 Diametrically opposed is a decision by the Alabama court that statutes which
confer power upon clerks of court to issue warrants of arrest are
constitutional and the warrants thus issued are valid.'" Likewise,
the Kansas court upheld the validity of a warrant issued by a
coroner. 19

The foregoing authorities indicate clearly the diversity of opinion
concerning whether the issuance of a warrant is a judicial act,
and whether it must be confined to a strictly judicial officer. The
desire for a logical and legally sound result forces us to a consideration of the second specific issue, whether the courts of West Virginia
will sanction a liberal interpretation of the separation of powers
provision and thus allow a slight overlapping of functions at the
lower levels of government. One excellent explanation of what is
meant by the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and
See also,
12 State v. McGowan, 243 N.C. 431, 90 S.E.2d 703 (1956).
State ex rel. Staley v. Hereford, 131 W. Va. 84, 86, 45 S.E.2d 738, 739 (1947);
ALI MODEL CODE: OF PE-ARR aGNmENT PRocEDUtRE § 6.03 (1966).
1"Bienenstock v. McCoy, 194 Misc. 927, 8 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1949).
145AM. JuR.2d Arrest § 10 (1962).
1s 1 ALExANDER, LAw OF ARREST § 61 (1949). These include Congress,
the Secretary of Labor, Parole Boards, governors, some sheriffs, marshalls,
coroners, boards of health, administrative boards and commissioners.
16 5 Okla. Crim. 605, 115 P. 376 (1911).
11 Id. at 607, 115 P. at 376.
,8 Kreulhaus v. City of Birmingham, 164 Ala. 623, 51 So. 297 (1909).
19 State v. Brecount, 82 Kan. 195, 107 P. 763 (1910).
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a strong argument for allowing an overlapping is contained in the
following:
S.. But when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of government, and maintain, that that separation
is indispensible to public liberty, we are to understand this
maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to affirm that they
must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and
have no common link of connexion or dependence, the one upon
the other, in the slightest degree. The true meaning is, that
the whole power of one of these departments should not be
exercised by the same hands, which possess the whole power
of either of the other departments; and that such exercise of the
whole would subvert the principles of a free constitution."

The majority cited only Wheeling Bridge & T. Ry. Co. v. Paull2 '
in support of the position that a slight overlapping was permissible.
In the Wheeling Bridge case, the West Virginia court held that
there must necessarily be an overlapping of functions in responsible
officials at the lower levels of government to preclude the cost
of government becoming too burdensome. 2 As opposed to that view
the West Virginia court has ruled many times that the separation
of powers provision is clear and free from ambiguity and must
be strictly enforced.23
A logical conclusion from the foregoing authorities would indicate that in the past the West Virginia court has favored strict
enforcement of the separation of powers provision. The courts
also interpret and endeavor to preserve inviolate the intentions of our
legislatures. Yet public policy, expediency and the practicability
of a decision tend to color and influence this judicial interpretation.
The West Virginia court held that the issuance of a warrant by a
lieutenant of police was not a violation of the separation of powers
provision. It thus appears that the West Virginia court was obliged
to recede from its adamant determination to strictly enforce the
20 2 STORY, CON24ENTAREIS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 524 (1833) (emphasis added).
21 39 W. Va. 142, 19 S.E. 551 (1894).
22 Id. at 144, 19 S.E. at 551.
23 State ex rel. State Bldg. Comm. of W. Va. v. Bailey, 150 S.E.2d 449
(W. Va. 1966). See also, State v. Huber, 129 W. Va. 198, 40 S.E.2d 11
(1946); Hodges v. Public Serv. Comm., 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S.E. 834 (1931);
Danielley v. City of Princeton, 113 W. Va. 252, 167 S.E. 620 (1933).
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separation of powers provision in order to arrive at what in essence
amounted to a more expedient and practical result.
Daniel L. Schofield

Estate Tax-The Relevancy of State Court
Adjudication of Property Rights
In 1930 decedent, D, created a revocable trust which as amended
in 1931 provided his wife, W, with income for life and a general
power of appointment over the corpus. In 1951 W executed an
instrument purporting to change it to a special power. Upon D's
death in 1957 the executor of the estate in paying federal estate
taxes attempted to claim the value of the widow's trust as a marital
deduction under section 2056(b) (5) of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code.' However, the commissioner determined that the trust
corpus did not qualify because of the 1951 release. The respondent,
who was the executor, then filed a petition for redetermination in the
Tax Court. However, while this was pending the respondent filed a
petition in the Supreme Court of New York asking for a determination of the validity of the release. The state court found the release
to be a nullity; the Tax Court then accepted the state court judgment as being an, "authoritative exposition of New York law and
adjudication of the property rights involved," and allowed the
marital deduction. Held; reversed and remanded. When the application of a federal statute is involved the decision of the state
trial court as to an underlying issue concerning relevant property
rights is not controlling if there is no decision by the highest court
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056 (b) (5):
Life estate with power of appointment in surviving spouse.-In the
case of an interest in property passing from the decedent, if his
surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the entire
interest,

.

. .

with power in the surviving spouse to appoint the

entire interest. . . . (exercisable in favor of such surviving spouse,
or of the estate of such surviving spouse, or in favor of either,
whether or not in each case the power is exercisable in favor of
others), and with no power in any other person to appoint any part
of the interest, or such specific portion, to any person other than
the surviving spouse(A) the interest . . . so passing, shall, for the purposes of
subsection (a), be considered as passing to the surviving spouse,
and (B) no part of the interest so passing shall, for the purposes of
paragraph (1) (A) be considered as passing to any person other than
the surviving spouse....
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